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Abstract
This article focuses on the dilemmas and trade-offs that third parties face whenmediating violent political conflicts. Should
they ignore human rights violations because pushing the issue could jeopardize relationships with political actors who
grant access for humanitarian aid? Will bringing moderates and hardliners together help the peace process or radicalize
moderate actors? What should dialogue facilitators do when the act of identifying non-mainstream groups to be included
into dialogue increases division and polarization? The activity of peacemaking is inherently characterized by such process
and strategy dilemmas where two equally compulsory imperatives seem not to be attainable at the same time. The arti-
cle proposes a framework to break out of either-or thinking in these situations. We argue that: 1) making oneself aware
of how a decision is perceived, and 2) systematically exploring a set of different strategies for creating new unexpected
options helps to ease these decisions and avoid rotten compromises. The model reworks and combines existing problem-
solving strategies to create a new explorative option generation approach to peacemaking dilemmas and trade-offs. Some
of these strategies, such as sequencing and incrementalization, are already well-established in peacemaking. Others, such
as compartmentalization and utilization, are rather unconsciously used. All identified strategies, however, are not yet
systematically employed to manage third parties’ own dilemmas and trade-offs. Under the suggested framework, these
strategies can act in complement to synthesize creativity and strategic thinking with surprising ease. Using examples from
the authors’ peacemaking activities and observations in Myanmar, Thailand, and Ukraine, the article demonstrates the
real-world benefits of the framework in terms of decision assessment and optional thinking.
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1. Introduction
In peacemaking, good things do not easily come together.
Rather, several priorities typically compete with or con-
tradict one another. As both scholars and practition-
ers of this field, working in Myanmar, South Thailand,
and Ukraine, we see firsthand the dilemmas inherent in
peacemaking processes, and also the sacrifices in the
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trade-offs we and others make in these situations. In
essence, even the most basic principle of ‘do no harm’
is sometimes arguably unachievable (UK Government
Stabilization Unit, 2019, p. 7). Thinking how we—and
others in the field—could better deal with these quan-
daries, we delved into the problem-solving and decision-
making literature of various disciplines and found a range
of promising strategies for dilemma and trade-off situ-
ations. Through an iterative process we developed the
Tough Choices Framework. The prototype has been road-
tested and adapted in a first round of practical applica-
tions. In this article, we share thismodel for the first time
with the wider public. More broadly, we aim to create
an understanding of dilemmas and trade-offs as inherent
tensions of the peacemaking process, which require re-
sponses based in sensitivity, creativity and pragmatism.
Our understanding of peacemaking encompasses all
third-party interventions that aim to prevent, manage
or resolve violent conflicts. The dilemmas and trade-offs
in this field are as manifold as the contexts and situ-
ations in which they occur; yet they all reflect peace-
making’s basic dialectics between negative and positive
peace, short and long-term goals, and pragmatic and
ethical or legal aims: “First, the third parties must help
the belligerents abandon the status quo of armed hos-
tilities. Second, they must foster a new relationship be-
tween the combatants that precludes the return to vio-
lence” (Beardsley, 2011, p. 3). Particularly when tempted
or pressured to settle agreements quickly (UN, 2006,
p. 495), the resulting compromises can have significant
negative societal impacts, such as “sacrificing democracy
in the short-run in order to establish peace and stability
as pre-requisites for the consolidation of democracy in
the long-run” (Nathan, 2016, p. 3). In essence, peacemak-
ing dilemmas and trade-offs result from the apparently
competing mandates that pervade the whole field, with
roots in the UN Charter and other key documents (e.g.,
‘stop the fighting’ and ‘address punishable human rights
violations,’ UN, 2006, p. 495).
Despite a growing range of studies that focus
on peacemaking dilemmas of political and strategic
(Beardsley, 2011; Greig & Diehl, 2005; Margalit, 2010;
UK Government Stabilization Unit, 2019, p. 5; Zartman,
2008), methodological, ethical, and legal nature (Bush,
1994; Frazer, 2015; Hellmüller, Palmiano Federer, & Pring,
2017; Kraus, 2011a, 2011b; Palmiano Federer, 2018;
Shapira, 2018, pp. 354–363), their generic patterns and
mitigation techniques have not yet been systematically
analyzed in the conflict resolution literature. Only the
brokering of agreements that may violate international
norms has gained some attention, for instance in the
context of transitional justice (Davis, 2014; Hayner, 2018;
Kirchhoff, 2009), gender equality or inclusivity (Lanz,
2011; Paffenholz, 2014). Single studies encourage medi-
ators to apply mediation techniques to their own dilem-
mas (treating conflicting imperatives as positions and un-
derlying goals as interests) but again leave open how
to deal with conflicts between incommensurable goals
(Shapira, 2018, p. 361). Hands-on guidance for peace-
makers on how to manage dilemmas and trade-offs in
everyday practice is particularly rare (UK Government
Stabilization Unit, 2019). Altogether, there is a remark-
able discrepancy between the level of difficulty andmag-
nitude of sacrifices resulting from dilemmas and trade-
offs in peacemaking, and the low awareness and scant
methodological resources to address them.
Conversely, other disciplines like psychology, ethics,
and business, offer a broad range of methodologies for
dealing with dilemmas and trade-offs in a constructive
manner (laid out in Sections 3 and 4). Their common de-
nominator is that even in the most controversial, dead-
locked and painful cases, there aremore unexpected pos-
sibilities than usually imagined. To detect these possibili-
ties, one needs to employ exploratory optional thinking,
i.e., systematically develop multiple and diverse options
without seeking confirmation for what is already seen as
(not) viable (Schneider & Shanteau, 2003, pp. 438–439;
Weston, 2006, pp. VI, 3, 7). Most peacemaking actors are
familiar with such techniques to find common ground
between conflict parties (Cooley, 2005), but they usu-
ally do not apply these skills to their own dilemma per-
ception and decision-making. Nor are these techniques
alone enough. They need to be integrated into an ap-
proach that expressly helps to break out of habitual pat-
terns of thinking.
We argue that truly constructive ways of dealing
with dilemmas and trade-offs begin when we acknowl-
edge that we have reached an impasse and look beyond
the immediate controversies and difficulties, and beyond
what we hold as right and wrong (Weston, 2006, p. VI).
This means deliberately changing our mode of thinking:
abandoning the unfruitful efforts of forcing the compet-
ing claims together, and instead exploring unusual and
more indirect responses in a creative and playful man-
ner. We are not arguing for discarding the standard re-
sponse of deliberating and weighing the conflicting im-
peratives (Shapira, 2018, pp. 357–360), but rather for
complementing this practice with a preceding routine:
respect normative, political and practical limits where
they have a truly constitutive function, try to deconstruct
them where they do not, and uncover and utilize the
space of unusual but acceptable possibilities that have
either been overlooked or never explored.
The model we developed emerged from bridging
dilemma theory and peacemaking practice using an
action research approach (Kraus & Kyselova, 2018).
Theoretical and methodological knowledge was applied
to, and tested in, peacemaking activities, and from that
a framework was developed that aims to be helpful both
in theory and practice. The modeling was inspired by
bricolage research (Rogers, 2012), meaning that we as-
sembled different conceptual and methodological ap-
proaches to get a better grasp of the problem so as
to develop alternative readings and practices (Rogers,
2012, pp. 1–2). The model re-contextualizes existing
decision-making concepts aswell as problem-solving and
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dilemma strategies and marries them into a new over-
all approach. The prototype will be further tested and
modified in collaboration with practitioners and politi-
cal decision-makers until it has proven useful in different
peacemaking contexts.
After briefly outlining three examples that will serve
as illustrations throughout our article, we then clarify
what preciselymakes those decisions difficult from a con-
ceptual point of view. Next, we describe the ideas that
inspired the model, explain its components and demon-
strate how it works.
2. Difficult Decisions in Peacemaking: Three Examples
fromMyanmar, Thailand, and Ukraine
The three examples that illustrate the type of difficult de-
cisions on which we are focusing draw on our own ex-
periences and observations in Myanmar, Thailand, and
Ukraine. These cases were selected both for pragmatic
andmethodological reasons. Given that wewere directly
involved in supporting or observing peacemaking activ-
ities, these contexts were a natural place to begin our
investigation. Methodologically, they also represented
diverse settings, with differing intervention strategies,
which could be compared and contrasted to build a gen-
eralizable framework.
2.1. Myanmar
In 2017, attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
on government outposts in Myanmar’s northwestern
Rakhine state resulted in the Myanmar military’s dispro-
portionate crackdown on the Rohingya Muslim popula-
tion. The crackdown has led to mass exodus of more
than 700,000 Rohingyas into neighboring Bangladesh
(Human Rights Council, 2018). For the UN in Myanmar,
two imperatives clashed: On the one hand, the UN man-
date clearly called for a response to grave human rights
abuses against the Rohingya population. On the other
hand, it was necessary for the UN to maintain a coop-
erative relationship with the Myanmar government and
military in order to ensure the provision of aid to both
Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim communities in Rakhine
state. The UN’s normative imperative to uphold and pro-
tect human rights thus collided with the strategic and
normative imperative to maintain political, humanitar-
ian, and developmental access to the country.
2.2. Thailand
A violent separatist conflict in theMalayMuslimmajority
south of Thailand has claimed over 6,000 lives since 2004.
Many in the minority Buddhist community feel marginal-
ized, perceiving that peacebuilding efforts there have fo-
cused on the grievances of the Malay Muslim popula-
tion. An intra-Buddhist dialogue project was launched to
prevent such sentiments from becoming an obstacle to
peacebuilding. The project aimed to: a) provide a safe
space for Buddhists to voice their concerns; b) support
Buddhists to communicate these concerns to other stake-
holders; and c) thereby encourage efforts by the author-
ities and Malay Muslims to engage with the Buddhist
community in a way that took account of their concerns.
However, facilitating a dialogue inclusive of all view-
points within the Buddhist community risked providing a
platform for ‘anti-peace’ voices interested in strengthen-
ing opposition to engagement and dialogue with other
groups. Thus, the project’s approach of preparing the
Buddhist community to engage with other stakehold-
ers in constructive ways that could contribute to peace-
building ran the danger of undermining the support for
Buddhist involvement in peacebuilding that it ultimately
aimed to promote.
2.3. Ukraine
Currently, inter-community dialogues in Ukraine suffer
from the absence of Ukrainianswith non-mainstreampo-
litical views such as anti-Maidan, anti-European, or pro-
Russian (Kyselova, 2018). These views are widespread
enough to deserve a voice (SCORE, 2016) and accord-
ing to the basic assumption of the inclusion impera-
tive, any societal model that does not include them will
be inherently undermined. Within the adverse context
of on-going armed conflict in the East of Ukraine and
the dominant conflict narrative of Russian aggression
in Ukraine, these population groups are dispersed, dis-
organized, and delegitimized by dominant political dis-
course. To include them, one would first need to iden-
tify and legitimize them. However, beyond the security
risks of such inclusion, dialogue facilitators fear that by
naming and distinguishing these political identities they
would strengthenor even initiate dynamics thatwould in-
evitably deepen the division lines in the society, namely
in-group/out-group identity narratives and polarizing po-
litical identity discourses in the public sphere (Svensson
& Brounéus, 2013).
3. Dilemmas and Trade-Offs: What Makes Them
Difficult—And Easier
Dilemmas and trade-offs are closely related terms. As
decision-making and conflict resolution literature offers
no precise distinction so far (definitions rather seem to
overlap, see Gowans, 1987, p. 3; Shapira, 2018, p. 354),
we suggest the following delineation of the terms.
We understand a dilemma as a standoff between
two or more imperatives (A vs. B) that are perceived as
equally compulsory but not attainable at the same time,
leaving only either-or options. A trade-off is understood
as a balancing of two or more imperatives (A vs. B) that
are perceived as similarly compulsory and opposed, but
partly satisfiable at the same time by exchanging one
thing in return for another. Both, dilemma and trade-off,
can arise from normative and pragmatic claims. The dis-
tinction between the terms lies in two aspects: a) the
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state of perceived solvability—in a dilemma there seem
to be only clearly exclusive solutions possible that either
way neglect one of the imperatives, while a trade-off rep-
resents a balanced solution between both imperatives;
b) the state and moment in time of the decision-making
process—a dilemma is an unsolved decision problem
where no decision could be made yet, while a trade-off
represents an act or a result of a weighing up, thus a
solved decision problem, even if this solution is not sat-
isfying. The also closely related term of a paradox, which
is often confused with the term of a dilemma, describes
one self-contradictory statement, whereas a dilemma
and a trade-off both result from two contradictory, or
mutually exclusive, claims.
Using these terms as analytical lenses for the exam-
ples outlined above, the inter-community dialogues in
Ukraine are hampered by what we, as observers, per-
ceive as a dilemma: The imperative to include all relevant
political groups in political discourse (A) clashes with the
equally essential imperative to prevent further polariza-
tion within Ukrainian society (B). In the somewhat simi-
lar situation in southern Thailand, facilitators perceived
the two opposing imperatives rather as a trade-off that
had to be made: Giving space to the ‘anti-peace’ voices
(A) had to be constantly balanced with the other cen-
tral imperative, which was to jointly develop ‘pro-peace’
ideas and actions within the Buddhist community (B).
Holding a cognitive constructivist point of view, we
consider dilemmas and trade-offs as perception patterns
created by reference frames such as ideas, practices, nar-
ratives, goals, values, emotions, and beliefs (Goffman,
1986; Lakoff & Wehling, 2016). Frames are key codes for
making sense of the world and thus tend to resist change;
when their premises are incommensurable, compete, or
collide, a dilemma or trade-off is the result. Like the
frames themselves, the perception patterns of dilemmas
are contingent: Somepeople see dilemmas and trade-offs
where others—with other contexts and histories—do not
(Acharya, 2004; Harding, 2017). However, as frames are
inextricably linked to unconscious thinking habits, world-
views, existential experiences, and social identity, they
can be difficult to modify. Cognitive mechanisms like con-
firmation bias, where contradictory information is filtered
out, also serve to reinforce existing reference frames that
underly one’s original assessments of a situation.
The less constitutive a reference frame is for the indi-
vidual or social system holding it, the easier it is to alter it
and consequently what constitutes a dilemma or trade-
off. Fundamental normative convictions and established
principles will remain unsusceptible to such deconstruc-
tion, but they might entail more flexible aspects than as-
sumed. For instance, if the frames that determine what
ought to be done resist any attempts to change them, the
frames determining how this ought to be done might be
more open and flexible. Weston (2006, pp. 36–37) gives
some examples from other contexts for generating op-
tions that vary the how without disregarding given lim-
its of the what: The owner of a cafeteria in the 1950s in
North Carolina removed all tables from the place to treat
white customers the same way as black customers who
were forbidden to sit down under segregation-era laws.
Instead of seating black customers in direct defiance of
the law he looked for other modes of opposition; thus,
the first stand-up café was born of an anti-apartheid ini-
tiative. Another example is the teacher who shaved her
head after a child who had lost her hair in chemother-
apy was laughed at by classmates, resulting in a rash
of children also begging their parents to cut their hair.
Instead of camouflaging or moralizing the problem, the
teacher responded indirectly through an act of solidar-
ity, which turned an odd action into an appealing one
(Weston, 2006, pp. 36–37):
The general rule is to revisit all the parts of a prob-
lem, not just the one or two that currently fill the
screen….It may well be that some other aspect of a
problematic situation, pushed into the background at
the moment, offers us a way to go forward while the
current routes seem blocked.
This suggests we do not need to seek for better ways to
unblock blocked cognitive routes (embedded reference
frames that are resistant to change) but search for bet-
ter ways to detect and utilize flexibility in other aspects
of a dilemma or trade-off (reference frames that leave
more space for solutions than assumed).
In order to develop useful, applicable guidance
for decision-makers, our conceptual approach deliber-
ately focuses on the decision-makers’ subjective contex-
tual and situational perception when facing a decision.
Theoretical concerns, like the validity and even existence
of logical dilemmas (Gowans, 1987, pp. 3–33; Statman,
1995, pp. 29–54), will be left aside, as they are irrelevant
from a practitioner point of view: Whether or not the
dilemma is logically real or only perceived, in any case the
decision-makerwill have to explore the extent towhich it
can be effectively deconstructed in the (inter)subjective
reality of those involved.
4. The Tough Choices Framework: How to Make
Difficult Decisions Easier
4.1. Requirements
Dilemmas and trade-offs force peacemakers to make de-
cisions under highly challenging conditions: A problem’s
complexity is often exacerbated by a lack of information
and predictability regarding the potential costs and ben-
efits of different solution options. Furthermore, the hu-
manitarian, societal, political, moral, andmonetary costs
deriving from a proposed decision might be impossible
to prioritize.
However, extensive needs assessment with practi-
tioners revealed that, rather than a complex instrument
for calculating and weighing up of potential costs and
benefits of available options, what is required is a sim-
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ple framework for exploring whether better options ex-
ist(ed) than the ones already adopted. We explain this
by drawing on dual process theories of decision making:
The actual weighing up of costs and benefits takes place
in the automatic, intuitive thinking of system 1, in which
an experienced practitioner can correlate numerous sets
of subtle data from comparable cases, faster and more
reliably than any artificial intelligence can, let alone any
model we would be able to develop. In contrast, for gen-
erating new options that actually could expand the bene-
fits and reduce the costs, pro-active efforts of the system-
atic, rational, self-reflective thinking of system 2 are re-
quired (Kahneman, 2012; see also Section 4.3). System 2
thinking needs both more time and consciously struc-
tured guidance in order to produce meaningful results.
With this working hypothesis on the requirements
for the model we focused on strategies for generating
new options in a systematic fashion to support system 2
thinking, while system 1 thinking would automatically di-
gest and weigh up the results. We still included routine
feedback loops for assessing the degree of satisfaction
achieved through the strategies, but the actual weighing
up of benefits and costs is deliberately left to system 1
thinking. In our future research, we will test the hypothe-
sis behind this set up; in case it proveswrong, an element
for systematically weighing up the costs and benefits of
the options generated by the strategies needs to be inte-
grated into the model.
4.2. Theoretical Underpinnings
This section presents a short overview of the main theo-
ries that inspired the framework.
An important indicator that reflective practice is
needed is when “professionally designed solutions to
public problems have had unanticipated consequences,
sometimesworse than the problems theywere designed
to solve,” as seems to have been the case in some peace-
making compromises (Schön, 1983, p. 4). Reflective prac-
ticemodels are simple, cyclical structures for problem as-
sessment, developing options, and planning implemen-
tation (see Borton, 1970). Some of these models have
already been applied to mediation (Macfarlane, 2002).
With adaptive peacebuilding (de Coning, 2018), iterative
experiential learning has become an important aspect of
improving peace processes on the whole, but it has not
yet been applied to dealing with dilemmas.
In complex or chaotic environments such as peace-
making, where no clear cause–effect relationships are
discernible and contexts vary greatly, a decontextualized
best practice from one context will not work in most
other cases (Mason, 2016; Snowden & Boone, 2007).
Thus, the bestway to find outwhatworks in a conflict sce-
nario is by experimenting with different strategies. As a
result, any genericmodel for peacemaking dilemmas and
trade-offs must avoid rigid, reductive, mechanistic think-
ing, and offer diverse and flexible options for promoting
exploratory thinking.
Drawing on cognitive dual-process theories, we
hold that whenever decisions imply a high degree of
complexity or create cognitive dissonance (Festinger,
2009), they require both intuitive system 1 and system-
atic/deliberative system 2 thinking to ensure the most
optimal solution (Gigerenzer, 2008; Kahneman, 2012).
Particularly where a decision-maker can draw on inter-
nalized experiential knowledge in their own judgments,
deliberative routines should be combined with intuitive
ones. Therefore, we aimed at a decision-making model
that would activate both analytical and creative thinking
in concert.
4.3. Main Components
The framework consists of a three-component model
focusing on clarifying the decision situation and stimu-
lating creative exploratory thinking. It offers two types
of strategies to generate innovative and unexplored op-
tions: ‘Separating the Responses,’ and ‘Reframing the
Reference Frames’ (Figure 1).
The strategies can be attempted in any sequence un-
til the potential solutions are considered sufficiently sat-
isfying to all actors concerned. The principle of ‘Starting
Start with the most promising!
If not, try
the other way
If not, try
the other way
S 
R	
R
 
R
	 F
MAP  D	
Result suﬃciently
sasfying?
Result suﬃciently
sasfying?
Figure 1.Main components of the Tough Choices Framework.
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with the Most Promising’ hence refers to the choice of
strategy for generating new options, not to the choice
between the conflicting imperatives. Thus, it is an instru-
ment for enlarging the bunch of options before or while
processing the weighing up in the highly complex and ef-
ficient manner of system 1 thinking (see Section 4.1).
This also implies that the prototypemodel leaves also
the identification of biases and blind spots (e.g., costs for
indirectly affected actors) and the explicit balancing of
risks to the individual decision-maker. Methodical guid-
ance for opening the entrapped or resignedmind to truly
new perspectives and ideas seemed (at least at this point
of research) muchmore important than ethical guidance
preventing and correcting shortcomings and distortions
when considering benefits and costs. We assume that
peacemaking actors do see the costs and risks of their
decisions and are constantly balancing their competing
priorities; what they lack are the methods to decrease
these potential costs in the first place. In the next round
of testing the model in practice, we will check if this as-
sumption holds true.
4.4. The Framework
4.4.1. Analyze the Decision Situation
The first step is mapping how the decision situation is
perceived by answering the following questions: What
are the conflicting imperatives (A vs. B)? Are we facing a
full dilemma or trying to balance a trade-off?What refer-
ence frames within the conflict, process and third-party
system exacerbate this tension?
In reference to the second question, the literature of-
fers no integrated analytical instrument to assess how a
decision problem is perceived. We propose the follow-
ing map: juxtaposing two factors, the (non)negotiability
of imperatives and the (in)compatibility of responses, de-
termines the perception of difficult decision situations.
These factors can then be used to interrogate this per-
ception and demonstrate how it might be altered to find
more satisfying solutions. Figure 2 measures the nego-
tiability of imperatives on the vertical axis, and the com-
patibility of responses on the horizontal axis. The point
where the two axes converge marks the lowest degree
of solvability and the diagonal opposite side marks the
highest. The resulting map measures the distance to a
satisfying solution for a given difficult situation.
Dilemma and trade-off situations have in common
that responses seem mutually exclusive or incompatible.
They differ in the degree of negotiability of their imper-
atives: In a dilemma, the imperatives are perceived as
non-negotiable, leaving only either-or options. In a trade-
off, a compromise that balances the two imperatives is at
least potentially achievable.
In the field of human rights, Margalit (2010) coined
the term of ‘rotten compromises’ for unacceptable solu-
tions, referring to the appeasement politics vis-à-vis the
German Nazi regime as an example: rotten compromises
“are not allowed, even for the sake of peace” because
they “establish or maintain an inhuman regime, a regime
of cruelty and humiliation, that is, a regime that does not
treat humans as humans” (Margalit, 2010, pp. 1–2). On
the map, rotten compromises are to be located opposite
to trade-offs: There is a practically feasible way out of
a dilemma but at the cost of something non-negotiable.
By integrating this term, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween acceptable (trade-offs) and unacceptable (rotten)
compromises. Dilemmas, trade-offs, and rotten compro-
mises all induce a distributive lose–lose or win–lose per-
ception pattern; win–win seems to be unthinkable in all
situations (Spangler, 2013).
The concepts of dilemma, trade-off, and rotten com-
promise should be illustrated with the example from
Myanmar. As introduced above, for the UN in Myanmar,
Trade-Oﬀ:
More here, less there
No feasible way to suﬃciently
sasfy both imperaves, but
balance is acceptable
Integraon:
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problem that does
not refer to the
imperaves
Figure 2. Anatomy of difficult decisions.
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two imperatives were involved: responding to (and
maybe preventing further) grave human rights abuses
against the Rohingya minority (A) and maintaining a co-
operative relationship with the Myanmar government
and military in order to ensure the provision of aid
to both Rakhine and Rohingya communities in Rakhine
state (B). One possible perception of this situation is to
regard it as a dilemma that leaves no other choice than
to either prioritize humanitarian access or publicly crit-
icize human rights violations. Another possible percep-
tion is to see the situation rather as a trade-off than a
complete dilemma, for example, consider it an accept-
able compromise to respond to the human rights imper-
ative by making non-public representations to the gov-
ernment. However, for many international observers—
without insight into internal decision-making processes
and parameters—such a response focusing on the hu-
manitarian could easily be perceived as a rotten com-
promise, compromising too much on human rights for
short-term humanitarian access (Safi, 2018). The frames
complicating the situation were substantial international
pressure to address human rights (without understand-
ing the nuances of the context), a perception by many
national actors of UN activities as foreign intrusion, and
probably also a lack of a clear and coherent mandate
from UN headquarters and UN member states.
Themap suggests two further alternative decision sit-
uations that do not entail compromising on imperatives.
The term ‘integration’ refers to situations where a win-
win response is possible that gives both claims what they
want to an sufficient extent; it represents a compatibility
and negotiability of the responses (Sparrer, 2007, p. 106;
Statman, 1995, p. 8). A neither-nor situation avoids the
typical patterns of either-or thinking, as it does not re-
spond to the imperatives at all but is capable of tran-
scending them (through humor or refraining from eval-
uation, for example; Sparrer, 2007, pp. 106–108). In the
Myanmar case, an integrative solution of theUNcould be
to delegate the provision of humanitarian aid to another
organization making sure that the humanitarian impera-
tive is fully taken care of by somebody else, so the UN
can focus its mission on human rights issues. Here, an in-
tegration of imperatives is made possible by thinking be-
yond the actors and resources already considered for re-
sponse. A neither-nor situation would entail the promo-
tion and acceptance of a Myanmar national identity that
recognizes and accepts diverse ethnic and religious back-
grounds, so that conflicting ethnoreligious groups may
co-exist together without feeling a sense of loss or con-
cession. This would require, however, inter-generational
change of historical narratives, thus identity reference
frames embedded over hundreds of years, and is far be-
yond the scope of many international peace supporters,
including the UN.
As one navigates through a decision-making process
and considers different response options, one’s percep-
tion of a situation may move between the different po-
sitions on the map: For instance, one might start from
a dilemma perception and see no viable options at all;
then, trying out all of the strategies, one might find the
resulting options represent a rotten compromise, or a
trade-off, or even the possibility for an integration of
both imperatives or a neither-nor solution. The model’s
dilemma strategies will thus be mainly used to recon-
figure dilemma, rotten compromise, and trade-off posi-
tions into a somehow better position, ideally into an in-
tegration or neither-nor configuration.
Locating their own perception of the decision prob-
lem on the decision map can help peacemakers to vi-
sualize how the other positions would look like in their
case. This brings their thinking closer to the next step, to
search for strategies that avoid unacceptable and unnec-
essary compromises on imperatives. In the following sec-
tion, we outline a menu of response options that peace-
makers can consider to this effect.
4.4.2. Developing Response Options
Once the situation has been mapped, the next step of
the framework is to choose from two sets of strategies
for developing response options (Figure 3). The strate-
gies offer different avenues to address the perception of
difficulty of a given decision that was analyzed in step
one: ‘Separating the Responses’ aims to deconstruct the
incompatibility of response options to conflicting imper-
atives. ‘Reframing the Reference Frames’ seeks to deal
constructively with the non-negotiability of imperatives.
The two avenues help assess what type of strategymight
be fruitful: Is the case so intractable because the re-
sponses to the two imperatives are so incompatible that
they can simply not be realized at the same time? Then
one might first try the strategies in the first column that
in one way or another hold the conflicting responses
apart. Or is the situation so difficult because the two con-
flicting imperatives are so absolute that that they cannot
be reconciled? In this case one might first try the strate-
gies in the second column that address flexible elements
in the framing of thewhole problemperception or in how
acceptable responses can look.
In working through the strategies, the most organic
approach is to start with the set of strategies that, ac-
cording to this first assessment of the case, looks most
promising. Then onemay continue in any sequence in an
explorative way. It is recommended that all four strate-
gies in a set are applied to ensure as robust a solution as
possible is found. The specific case conditions that make
one or the other strategy appropriate to particular deci-
sion problem types will be explored in further compara-
tive empirical research using this prototype as a common
basis. As well, we will investigate whether the strategies
typically produce specific types of results (rotten compro-
mises, trade-offs, integration, neither-nor).
While brainstorming potential solutions, an intuitive
process of balancing and evaluating priorities automati-
cally takes place (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). Not all strate-
gies will make sense in each case, and some might even
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Priorize
Rate responses diﬀerently according
importance, chances and risks
SEPARATE THE
RESPONSES
Sequence
Time responses one aer another
according urgency and ﬂexibility
Incrementalize
Find gradual (non-threateningly small
or indirect) simultaneous responses
Compartmentalize
Split up roles, responsibilies, informaon
into independent units
Meta-frame
Idenfy joint basis or compable goals
from higher perspecve
REFRAME THE REFERENCE
FRAMES
Rescale
Zoom in/out at smaller or bigger picture
of conﬂict, actor, process set up
Ulize
Find out in which sense the dilemma can
actually be useful and beneﬁcial
Bypass
Invent creave subsitute structure
sasfying both funconal aims
Figure 3. Strategies for developing options.
do harm in certain circumstances. Therefore, it is vital
that, in addition to this automatic evaluation process, all
potential solutions be located on the decision map so
their degree of success can be measured (Figure 1).
4.4.2.1. Strategies to Separate the Responses
The approach of the four strategies in this column is
to uncouple the responses from the conflicting impera-
tives: They challenge the perceived necessity to respond
with the same importance (Prioritize), at the same time
(Sequence), to the same extent (Incrementalize), or by
the same actor (Compartmentalize).
Prioritizing, the most classical strategy in all fields
from management to ethical decision-making, is order-
ing the responses according to their importance, urgency,
opportunities, and risks, or effort required (Gert, 2007,
pp. 60–79). However, ranking is only possible if one over-
riding frame (e.g., ethical ideals, political or practical ne-
cessities) can be established. In dilemmas with compet-
ing, incommensurable reference frames prioritization is
unlikely to bear fruit. With regards to the Rohingya crisis
in Myanmar, the UN seemed to have prioritized the im-
perative to keep life-saving humanitarian access to all res-
idents in the poverty-stricken Rakhine state over the im-
perative of explicitly addressing deep-seated political and
human rights abuses reported against Rohingya Muslims
(which held comparably low chances of success).
Sequencing, another well-established strategy in
peacemaking (Weiss, 2003), refers to timing responses
one after another according to their urgency and flex-
ibility. The typical risk of this strategy—failing to envi-
sion follow-up steps or getting derailed after the first
step(s) are completed—needs to be carefully managed.
In the case of Thailand, the trade-off between ‘anti’ vs.
‘pro-peace’ voiceswas balanced out by sequencing them:
First giving space to ‘anti-peace’ voices, based on the
assumption that they needed to feel heard before they
could listen and be ready to change their attitudes to-
wards peacebuilding activities. In Ukraine, the current
absence of pro-Russian groups from dialogue activities
can be rationalized as postponing the inclusion of these
groups until the hot phase of the armed conflict is over.
This might explain why around 70% of the dialogues car-
ried out by professional local Ukrainian facilitators deal
with technical issues (reforms, Human Rights, integration
of IDPs, restoration of community infrastructure), but
not with reconciliation (Kyselova, 2018).
Incrementalizing is an increasingly popular approach
in the peacemaking field (Conciliation Resources, 2018;
Hayes, 2017), but has yet to be explicitly incorporated
in dilemma/trade-off strategy. It describes a gradual ac-
cumulation of small or indirect changes in service of an
imperative that are compatible with responses to a con-
flicting imperative. The imperceptibility of changes re-
duces resistance to these interventions and lets the sys-
tem slowly adapt to change. Because of the ethical dan-
gers of imperceptible manipulation, incremental strate-
gies need to be critically examined to confirm whether
they are justified and must ensure the consent of ac-
tors for the intended changes. The Thailand dialogue
project incrementally shifted the exclusive focus on intra-
group dialogue (which risked reinforcing or perpetuat-
ing anti-peace voices) to a mix of intra-group dialogue
and inter-group dialogue with representatives of Malay
Muslims. Hardliners could become more familiar with
Malay Muslims and come to see the value of rebuild-
ing relationships.
Compartmentalization, a concept taken from psy-
choanalysis, describes mechanisms that permit contra-
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dicting cognitions, principles, tasks, or responsibilities
to co-exist without friction by setting boundaries be-
tween them or splitting them up in independent units
(McWilliams, 2011, pp. 135–136). In political science,
organization theory, and economics, compartmentaliza-
tion underpins the idea of role division, delegation, and
outsourcing (Falcó-Gimeno, 2011). In its most radical
form, mediation actors with non-negotiable conditions
or restrictions might be replaced by other more flexible
ones. In the years before the crisis, there seemed to be a
role division between different UN actors, with UN actors
with specific human rights or humanitarian mandates
being delegated to carry out substantive negotiations
on human rights and humanitarian issues. However, as
some Myanmar nationals in Rakhine state see all inter-
national actors as a monolith, many stakeholders still
viewed the UN in Myanmar as a human rights agent.
Perhaps this could have been overcome by shifting cer-
tain activities, e.g., provision of humanitarian aid, to orga-
nizations outside the UN system, leaving the UN to focus
on human rights issues. In Thailand, compartmentaliza-
tion could be used in targeted dialogues with sub-groups
(e.g., only monks or hardliners) as small group dialogue
is more transformative than larger group dialogue with
higher diversity.
4.4.2.2. Strategies for Reframing the Reference Frames
The approach of the second set of strategies is to iden-
tify alternative reference frames that allow for the issue
to be seen as a creative opportunity (Goffman, 1986;
Weston, 2006). To achieve this, one can identify com-
monalities (Metaframe), focus or broaden perspectives
(Rescale), find hidden opportunities (Utilize) or develop
acceptable substitutes (Bypass).
Metaframing looks at conflicting imperatives from a
broader perspective to find a joint basis or goal. In peace-
building, metaframing is already successfully used to
bridge divided groups by strengthening overarching com-
mon identities (Sasse & Lackner, 2018; Shapiro, 2017).
For example, in Northern Ireland efforts have beenmade
to bridge the divide between Catholic/Nationalist and
Protestant/Unionist identities by emphasizing a common
Northern Irish identity. Similarly, technical dialogues in
Ukraine already frame discussions around broad issues
of practical concern to all that encompass the specific is-
sues of many groups (Kyselova, 2018, p. 9). Frames such
as talking about shortcomings of political reforms might
be also able to attract unrepresented political viewswith-
out dividing the participants along political lines.
Rescaling zooms in or out to a smaller or bigger pic-
ture of the conflict, the process and the third-party con-
text. This practice can allow a switch into a genuinely dif-
ferent process logic, with different premises and goals.
In this case, the Ukrainian example may once again be
instructive. Including and validating pro-Russian perspec-
tives in a country that largely considers Russia as an ag-
gressor might be an unrealistic task. Comparatively, in-
corporating these minority viewpoints at the local level,
and focused on specific and concrete themes (e.g., de-
communization) may prove more feasible. In Myanmar,
the situation in Rakhine state could be rescaled from
either human rights or humanitarian access impera-
tives to larger political themes such as national iden-
tity and belonging, the legal and constitutional frame-
work, the role of authority, self-determination, equality,
and education.
Utilization, a strategy derived from psychotherapy
(Hammel, 2011), turns the problem into a resource: It
explicitly recognizes and positively takes advantage of
controversial elements instead of fighting against them.
The unexpected, and often openly paradox positive fram-
ing of an acknowledged obstacle can result in a moment
of enlightened surprise, and thereby a release of pres-
sure. In the Thai case, a fearless acknowledgement of
the fear of radicalization could give the groups an open-
ing to discuss their differences and shared views with-
out constraints—perhaps blowing off the elephant in the
room more quickly than ever imagined. In a similar vein,
the UN in Myanmar could have chosen to explicitly en-
gage the international community in discussions about
the underlying dilemma. This could, in turn, have fos-
tered more nuanced thinking about the context of the
conflict, and may have released some of the pressure to
address human rights. Clearly identifying the major ob-
stacle could further be used as an opportunity to clarify
the mandate from UN headquarters and to contextual-
ize international human rights standards into aMyanmar-
specific, or even Buddhist, perspective.
Bypassing refers to a method that seeks a pragmatic
substitute or provisional mechanism that satisfies the
imperatives in some alternative way. These measures
typically circumvent the problem or postpone the so-
lution; consequently, they often confer some genuine
functional or strategic advantage in order to compensate
for the apparent political or ethical concession. In the
Ukrainian case, bypassing could include choosing to ig-
nore the absence of non-mainstream views in dialogues.
Instead, other, tailor-made and low-threshold mecha-
nisms of civic participation in communities could be de-
veloped that would include minority views. This could
avoid further polarization between political affiliation
groups and create an opportunity to show the Ukrainian
people that civil society groups (which some consider
to be puppets of the Russian government) are part of
Ukrainian democratic structures that deserve their trust.
5. Conclusion
In sum, when facing intractable dilemmas and trade-offs,
peacemakers do not necessarily need to capitulate if
they dare to be creative. The framework presented in
this article offers a practically applicable routine of sys-
tematic optional thinking for situations that otherwise
could be considered unsolvable. By walking through dif-
ferent strategies for developing alternative responses,
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the model reduces and reorganizes the complexity of dif-
ficult decisions. It reveals both non-negotiable red lines
and the unseen flexibilities of each case. Used effec-
tively, the framework can help define and reveal context-
sensitive and widely acceptable solutions. In the best
case, the model can transform a lose–lose or win–lose
into a win–win situation, and turns dilemma and trade-
off decision-making into something playful and construc-
tive. In the worst case, a difficult decision might remain
unresolved even after all strategies have been attempted.
At a minimum, however, the framework provides a com-
prehensive and conscientious way to explain and justify
a tough choice.
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